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IN THE SUPREHE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, and STATE OF 
UTAH, by and through JOHN W. 
ROLLY. Director, Utah State 
Trade Commission, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
I.M.C. MINT CORPORATION, 
ROBERT GRABAR, GEORGE E. 
Tl'liBEY, et al. , 
Defendants. 
Case No. 16555 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a decision of the Third 
District Court wherein the court denied Appellant State Tax 
Commission's claim for priority payment of the sales and 
withholding tax debts of the defendant, I.M.C. Mint Corpora-
tion from the assets marshalled by the Receiver of the estate 
and property of said defendant. The Receiver is the Respondent 
on this appeal. 
DISPOSI'riON IN LOHER COURT 
On March 15, 1979, a hearing was held before the 
Honorable James S. Sawaya upon the Receiver's objections to 
the priority claims of the Utah State Tax Commission for 
certain sales and withholding taxes and penalties in con-
nection therewith. Memoranda of law were filed by counsel for 
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the Receiver and the State Tax Commission. After due con-
sideration, the district court issued an order sustaining the 
Receiver's ObJections to these priority claims, from which 
order the Tax Commission now appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Third District 
Court's determination and a ruling that the state's claims for 
sales and withholding taxes be declared superior to those 
claims of general, unsecured creditors. Respondent seeks an 
affirmance of the order below. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On June 21, 1974, a receivership was instituted at 
the instance of the Consumer Fraud Division of the Utah 
Attorney General's office and a Receiver appointed of the 
estate and property of I.M.C. Mint Corporation. (R. 12-13). 
Subsequently, the Tax Commission of the State of Utah filed 
claims of preferred debt with the Receiver in the amounts of 
$12,380.79 for unpaid sales tax (R. 440) and $7,538.22 for 
unpaid withholding of income tax (R. 441). 
The Receiver filed objections to those claims on the I 
I following basis: I 
1. The claims had no priority over claims of genera:/ 
creditors except to the extent that lien status was conferr~ I 
by statute upon the tax debts. 
-2-
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2. There was no lien in favor of the Tax Commission 
for either unpaid sales taxes or unpaid withholding taxes as 
of the date the receivership was instituted, there having been 
no warrant for either sales or withholding taxes filed by the 
Tax Commission pursuant to Sections 59-15-11 and 59-14-16, 
U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
3. The claim for withholding tax included penalties 
in the amount of $1,620.20 and the claim for sales tax in-
eluded penalties in the amount of $60.00, neither of which 
were properly allowable. (R. 438-41). 
A hearing on the obJections of the Receiver was held 
before the Honorable James s. Sawaya on March 15, 1979. (R. 
485-6). Arguments were heard and the Judge granted the 
request of the tax commission's counsel for leave to file a 
written memorandum of law on the issues involved with the 
state's claim for priority over general, unsecured creditors. 
Memoranda were filed by both parties. (R. 455-484). An order 
was issued sustaining the Receiver's objections. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EXISTENCE OF A LIEN IS THE ONLY BASIS 
UPON WHICH THE TAX CLAIMS ASSERTED HEREIN 
CAN BE GIVEN PRIORITY OVER THE CLAIMS OF 
OTHER CREDITORS. 
(R. 485). 
The central issue on this appeal is whether or not a 
lien existed in favor of the Tax Commission for unpaid sales 
taxes or unpaid withholding taxes and penalties in connection 
-3-
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therewith on the date the receivership was instituted even 
though warrants had not as yet been filed. Such a lien must 
arise, if at all, pursuant to the statutory provisions con-
ferring lien status on certain tax debts. 
In its brief, the Commission argues that tax claims 
are inherently superior to other claims, yet the Commission 
cites no authority either in the Utah case law or in the Utah 
statutes which would suggest that tax claims have some in-
herent priority over other claims irrespective of any priority 
status specifically conferred by statute upon such claims. 
In support of its inherent superiority claim, the 
Commission cites two decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court, Marshall v. New York, 254 U.S. 380 (1920), and Michigan\ 
Michigan Trust Co., 286 U.S. 334 (1932). In each of these 
cases the Supreme Court specifically identified the issues 
involved as issues of local law· and therefore, deferred to the 
local statutory provisions and case law. 
Whether the priority enjoyed by the 
state of New York is a prerogative right or 
merely a rule of adninistration is a matter 
of local law. Being such, the decisions of 
the highest court of the state as to the 
existence of the right and its incidents 
will be accepted by this court as conclusive. 
Marshall v. New York, 254 U.S. 380 at 384-85 
( 1920). 
We are not required to choose from 
these diversities the construction that 
-4-
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would appeal to us as the most consonant 
with reason if choice were wholly free. 
Choice, as it happens, is not free, for our 
task is to ascertain the meaning of a 
Michigan statute, and as to that the courts 
of the State, if they have spoken, pronounce 
the final word. Michigan v. Michigan Trust 
Co., 286 u.s. 334 at 342 (1932). 
The local law to which Appellant refers, however, 
lends no support to Appellant's argument and provides no 
guidance to this Court in determining the issues at hand. The 
cases of Hanson v. Burris, 86 Utah 424, 46 P.2d 400 (1935), 
affir~ed in Ingraham v. Hanson, 297 U.S. 378 (1936), Robinson v. 
Hanson, 75 Utah 30, 282 P. 782 (1929), and Union Cent. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Black, 67 Utah 268, 247 P. 486 (1926) cited in 
Appellant's brief do not address the issue of when a lien 
based upon unpaid taxes arises, which is the central issue of 
this appeal, but rather address the priority among admittedly 
existing liens. 
The only decision of the Utah Supreme Court cited by 
Appellant which addresses the issue herein is Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Wagstaff, 22 Utah 2d 177, 450 P.2d 100 (1969), 
which decision Appellant argues should be overruled. (Brief 
of Appellant p.2l). 
It should be noted that the case of Michigan v. 
Michigan Trust Co., supra, cited on pages 5 and 18 of Appellant's 
-5-
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brief addressed an issue which is different and distinct from 
the issue under discussion herein. In Michigan a receiversh~ 
was establisned to continue the corporate business rather than 
to aid in the dissolution of the corporation and the liquida-
tion of its business, which is the purpose of the I.M.C. Mint 
Corporation's receivership. In that context, the Court found 
that franchise taxes accruing for the most part during the 
pendency of the receivership, constituted a necessary cost of 
continuing the business and thus was an expense of the re-
ceivership having priority over other debts. 
Distinctions have been drawn between 
receivers appointed to carry on the 
business of a corporation with a view to 
the continuance of its corporate life, 
and receivers appointed in aid of the 
dissolution of the corporation or the 
liquidation of its business. 
* * * * 
Viewing the receivership in its 
true light as one, not to wind up the 
corporation, but to foster the assets, 
we think the annual taxes accruing while 
the receiver was in charge must be 
deemed expenses of administration and 
therefore charges to be satisfied in 
preference to the claims of general 
creditors. They are so treated in the 
order by which the receiver was ap-
pointed. By the order the receiver is 
directed in continuing the business to 
pay taxes and rentals and any other 
expenses necessary to enable the busi-
ness to go on, and to give such payments 
priority over other debts and obliga-
tions. These privilege fees were 
charges of the nature there described. 
Michigan v. Michigan Trust Co., 286 U.S. 
334 at 341-44 (1932). 
-6-
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Similarly in Coy v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 212 
F. 520 (D.Ct. Oregon 1914) aff'd 220 F. 90 (9th Cir. 1915), 
which is relied on and cited by the court in Michigan, the 
court addressed the issue of the receiver's obligation to pay 
pers.onal property taxes assessed and accrued during the pen-
dency of the receivership. In holding that the receiver had a 
duty to pay such taxes prior to the payment of other claims 
the Ninth Circuit in Coy relied on various treatises on 
receivers, one of which stated: 
Taxes levied upon personal property in 
the hands of a receiver become a 
charge upon the estate, and are 
properly payable by the receiver as a 
part of the costs and expenses of the 
administration of the trust. High on 
Receivers, §88la (4th Ed.) as quoted 
in Coy v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 
220 F. 90, 92 (9th Cir. 1915). 
It is a well established rule that costs and expenses 
of a receivership constitute a first charge against the property 
or funds in receivership. 66 Am. Jur. 2d, Receivers §280 at 98. 
The payment of taxes accruing during the pendency of the re-
ceivership and other costs or expenses of administration of the 
receivership is a separate and distinct issue from that of the 
priority of taxes such as those at issue herein which accrued 
prior to the institution of receivership proceedings and which 
cannot be categorized as an administration expense. 
Thus, the cases cited by the Appellant in its first 
point of argument are inapplicable and afford the court no 
assistance or guidance in the determination of the issue at hand. 
-7-
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POINT II. 
THE ACCRUAL OF SALES AND WITHHOLDING TAXES 
ALONE IS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH A LIEN 
AGAINST THE PERSONAL PROPERTY OF I.M.C. MINT 
CORPORATION WITHOUT THE FILING OF A WARRANT. 
As conceded by the Commission, the sales and with-
holding taxes upon which this controversy are based, accrued 
prior to the appointment of the Receiver, but no warrant based 
thereon was filed or docketed prior to the institution of the 
receivership. 
Rule 66(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires a receiver to discharge all taxes constituting a lien 
on personal property held by the receiver before such property 
can be sold or transferred: 
Payment of Taxes Before Sale or Hypothecation 
of Personal Property. Before any personal 
property corning into the hands of a receiver 
may be sold, transferred or hypothecated, 
such receiver shall pay and discharge any 
and all taxes constituting a lien thereon, 
legally levied by any taxing unit of the 
state, and shall file with the court having 
jurisdiction of such receivership, receipts 
or other competent evidence showing the 
full payment and discharge of any and all 
such taxes, provided, that in a case where 
no sufficient liquid assets are at the time 
of the proposed sale, transfer or hypothe-
cation, in the hands of such receiver, the 
court having jurisdiction of such receivership 
may authorize such sale, transfer or hypo-
thecation to be made prior to the payment 
and discharge of such taxes, but immediately 
-8-
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upon receipt of the consideration for such sale, 
transfer or hypothecation such receiver 
shall pay and discharge all such liens, 
taxes, and within 10 days thereafter shall 
file with the court receipts of other 
competent evidence showing the full payment 
and discharge of all such taxes. (Emphasis 
added). 
The pivotal issue is obviously whether or not the tax claims 
asserted herein by the commission constitute a lien on the 
personal property held in receivership. 
The Commission argues that the mere accrual of the 
tax constitutes a lien irrespective of whether or not a 
warrant has been filed, citing Section 59-14A-44(e) as es-
tablishing a lien to secure the payment of withholding taxes 
and Section 59-15-10 as establishing a lien for sales tax. l/ 
Although these sections appear on their face to establish 
liens for sales and withholding taxes, they must be read in 
the light of subsequent sections in the sales and withholding 
tax chapters which provide for the issuance of warrants. 
It should be noted that §59-15-10 only applies to a " ••• 
proprietor who shall sell out his business or stock of goods 
or shall guit business." Whether or not an involuntary 
receivership constitutes a selling out or a quitting of 
business is highly questionable. It is, however, an issue 
which is not specifically addressed because no lien exists, in 
any event, without the filing of a warrant. 
-9-
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Section 59-14A-79(c-e) of the Utah Code Annotated 
provides as follows: 
(c) If any person liable under this act for 
the payment of any tax, addition to tax, 
penalty or interest neglects or refuses to 
pay the same within ten days after notice 
and demand for payment has been given to 
such person under subsection (b) of this 
section, the tax commission may issue a 
warrant in duplicate under its official 
seal directed to the sheriff of any county 
of the state commanding him to levy upon 
and sell such person's real and personal 
property for the payment of the amount 
assessed, plus the cost of executing the 
warrant, and to return such warrant to the 
tax commission and pay to it the money 
collected by virtue thereof within sixty 
days after the receipt of the warrant. If 
the tax commission finds that the col-
lection of the tax or other amount is in 
jeopardy, notice and demand for immediate 
payment of such tax may be made by the tax 
commission and upon failure or refusal to 
pay such tax or other amount the tax 
commission may issue a warrant without 
regard to the ten-day period provided in 
this subsection. See section 59-14A-91 for 
provisions relating to Jeopardy assessment 
procedure. 
(d) Any sheriff who receives a warrant 
under subsection (c) of this section shall 
within five days thereafter file the 
duplicate copy with the clerk of the 
district court of the appropriate county. 
The clerk of such court shall thereupon 
enter in the judgment docket, in the 
column for JUdgment debtors, the name of 
the taxpayer mentioned in the warrant and, 
in appro8riate columns, the tax or other 
amounts for 11hich the warrant is issued and 
the date when such copy is filed; and such 
amount shall thereupon be a bin~lien 
upon the real, personal and other pr~erty 
of the taxpayer to the same extent as other 
judgments duly docketed in the office of 
such clerk. 
-10-
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(e) When a warrant has been filed with the 
county clerk, the tax commission shall, in 
the right of the people of the State of 
Utah, be deemed to have obtained judgment 
against the taxpayer for the tax or other 
amounts. 
Nearly identical language is found in Section 59-15-11 of the 
Utah Code Annotated in relation to sales tax. 
In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wagstaff, 22 Utah 2d 177, 
450 P.2d 100 (1969) the Utah Supreme Court interpreted language 
identical to the withholding tax provisions cited above and 
held: 
• . . that the lien of 
delinquent withholding 
run at the time notice 
by filing the warrant. 
102. 
a state for 
taxes begins to 
thereof is given 
450 P.2d at 
The Receiver submits that the Phillips case mandates 
the conclusion that the tax claims asserted herein did not 
constitute liens until warrants were filed. Inasmuch as the 
warrants were not filed at the institution of the receivership, 
no lien existed and therefore the tax claims have no priority. 
The Commission attempts to avoid the effect of the 
clear holding in the Phillips case by arguing first that other 
JUrisdictions have arrived at different interpretations of 
similar statutory language; second, that the interpretation in 
Phillips is somehow discredited by the legislative reenactment 
of language identLcal to the language interpreted in Phillips; 
-11-
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third, that Phillips is distinguishable from the present case; 
and fourth, that Phillips should be overruled. 
Generally, reference to the decisions of other juri~ 
dictions is only justified where there is no controlling au-
thority in the court's own jurisdiction. Even assuming that 
such reference is justified in this case despite the Phillips 
opinion, the interpretations of statutory provisions relatingto 
the creation of tax liens by courts in other jurisdictions are I 
only relevant to the extent that the statutory provisions of I 
those jurisdictions resemble the Utah statutes. 
The Commission cites District of Columbia v. Hechinge:' 
Properties Co., 197 A. 2d 157 (D. C. Ct. App. 1964) for the 
proposition that the existence of a tax lien for delinquent 
taxes does not depend upon the filing of a warrant. The Com-
mission points out the similarities between the Utah Statutes 
and the statutes of the District of 
the differences. These differences 
Columbia but fails to no~~ 
are in fact determinative[ 
the question ~1hether or not tax claims have priority as to I 
property in the hands of a receiver. There was no recei vershipl 
pending in the Hechinger case and therefore, the case is fac-
tually dissimilar to the present case. If a receivership had 1 
been pending in that case as is pending in the present case, ~ 
-12-
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statutes of the District of Columbia specifically provide that 
all taxes due and payable shall be paid by the receiver before 
any payment is made to other claimants. 
The District of Columbia statute reads as follows: 
Whenever the business or property of 
any person subject to tax under the 
terms of this chapter, shall be placed 
in receivership or bankruptcy, or 
assigrunent is made for the benefit of 
creditors, or if said property is 
seized under distraint for property 
taxes, all taxes, penalties, and 
interest imposed by this chapter for 
\lhich said person is in any way liable 
shall be a prior and preferred claim. 
Neither the United States marshal, 
nor a receiver, assignee, or any 
other officer shall sell the property 
of any person subject to tax under 
the terms of this chapter under pro-
cess or order of any court without 
first determining from the Collector 
the amount of any such taxes due 
and payable by said person, and if 
there be any such taxes due, mdng, 
or unpaid under this chapter, it shall 
be the duty of such officer to first 
pay to the Collector the amount of 
said sale before making any payment 
of any moneys to any judgment creditor 
or other claimants of whatsoever 
kind or nature. * * * (Emphasis 
added). D. C. Code <-74-2609 as cited 
in District of ColuG ia v. Hechinger 
Properties Co., 197 A.2d 157, 159 fn. 5 
(D.C. Ct. App. 1964). 
Under the District of Columbia statute, tax claims 
would have priority under the circumstances existing in the 
-13-
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present case irrespective of whether or not they constitute 
liens. These statutes should be contrasted with the Utah Rule I 
66(f) which requires the receiver to discharge only those taxes[ 
which constitute a lien on the property held by the receiver 
before paying other claims. 
Utah has no provisions similar to those of the Distri 
of Columbia, dealing with the priority tax claims in receiver· 
ship. The only Utah statutes which confer any priority status 
on tax claims are those cited above which have been interpretec 
by the Utah Supreme Court as conferring a lien only after the 
filing of a warrant. 
Also, the District of Columbia statutes specifical~ 
provide that the 1 ien for unpaid withholding taxes ". • . shaL 
accrue on the date that the amounts were withheld." D.C. Codel 
1961, §47-15869(f) (2). In contrast, Utah Code Annotated, I 
Section 59-14A-44(e) which establishes a lien for withheld 
taxes, does not specify an accrual date. 
The Commission argues on page 15 of its brief thatt 
enactment in 1973 of Sections in Chapter l4A using the same 
language as the parallel provisions on tax liens and warranU-
Chapter 14 somehow discredits the Phillips decision as a corn 
interpretation of the legislative intent. Actually, tne fact 
that the legislature did not change the language in light of L 
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Phillips decision would indicate that the legislature acquiesced 
in the interpretation of that language by the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
A further indication of the legislative acquiescence 
in this Court's interpretation of the language of the statute as 
then constituted, is the apparent recognition by the legisla-
ture, subsequent to the Phillips decision, of the need for a 
specific provision indicating the date a tax lien accrues or 
arises. In the 1979 General Session, the Utah Legislature 
adopted and the Governor has subsequently signed House Bill No. 
308 which added the following provision to Section 59-10-22 of 
the Utah Code Annotated: 
2. If any person liable to pay the 
Utah sales and withholding tax neglects or 
refuses to pay the same after demand, the 
amount, including any interest, additional 
amount, addition to tax, or assessable 
penalty, together with any costs that may 
accrue in addition thereto, shall be a 
lien in favor of the State of Utah upon 
all property and rights to property, 
whether real or personal, belonging to 
such person. 
3. Unless another date is speci-
fically fixed by law, the lien imoosed 
for state taxes shall arise at the time 
the assessment is made and shall continue 
until the liability for the amount so 
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assessed (or a judgment against the tax-
payer arising out of such liability) is 
satisfied or becomes unenforceable by 
reason of lapse of time. 
This amendment resolves controversies such as this 
one as to the accrual date of a tax lien in the future and 
thus the dire consequences of Phillips decision forecast by 
the Commission on page 20 of its Brief \<lill not come to pass. 
However, the Phillips decision still controls controversies 
such as the present one arising under the prior statutes which 
do not specify an accrual date other than the date of the 
filing of a warrant. 
Similarly unpersuasive, is the Commission's assertio: 
that the Phillips case is distinguishable from the present 
case and therefore the Phillips opinion is inapplicable. The 
Commission attempts to distinguish the Phillips case on the 
basis that a mortgagee relies on the public record to indicah\ 
clear title, whereas general creditors do not rely on public ' 
records in extending credit. The assumption that general 
creditors extend credit without checking public records is nm 
a reasonable assumption. It is not reasonable to assume that 
a general creditor of I.M.C. Mint Corporation would extend u 
much as $385,000, as one creditor has done, without thorou~~ 
investigating that company's financial responsibility through 
the public records in the Secretary of State's office and the 
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county Clerk's office. General creditors are entitled to rely 
on these records to the same extent as secured creditors. 
If liens are permitted to arise and exist without 
any reflection thereof in the public record, it would impair 
the practice of extending credit by general creditors just as 
seriously as it would impair the extension of credit by 
secured creditors. 
In Phillips, this Court based its holding that a 
lien arises only upon the filing of a warrant on the following 
consideration: 
the only record as to delinquent 
withholding taxes rests wholly within 
the knowledge of the employer until 
such time as the Tax Commission makes 
its determination as to the amount due 
and delinquent and files its warrant 
with the appropriate county clerk. 450 
P.2d at 102. 
The concern evidenced by this Court over the existence 
of secret liens is applicable to all forms of extension of 
credit. This concern is reflected in the legislative policy 
embraced by the filing provisions of Article Nine of the Utah 
Uniform Commercial Code. 
The argument that the Phillips case should be over-
ruled requires little comment. The Commission asserts that this 
Court ignored the plain language of the statute. In fact, this 
Court, faced with a split of opinion among district courts, gave 
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careful consideration to the interrelation of the statutory 
provisions relating to liens and warrants. This Court inter-
preted that statutory language to provide that a lien does not 
arise without the filing of a warrant. The legislature has 
apparently acquiesced in that interpretation and found it 
necessary to amend the statutes in order to provide for the 
accrual of a lien prior to the filing of a warrant. If the 
legislature intended under the prior statute to provide for the I 
accrual of a lien prior to the filing of a warrant, the legi~ I 
lature did not accomplish that purpose. In Phillips, this Court! 
was bound to interpret the statute as it then read. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF CLAIMS BY THE TAX 
COHMISSION FuR PENALTIES AND EXCESS INTEREST 
SHOULD BE UPHELD. 
The Tax Commission asserted in the court below that 
interest, penalties and costs for a receiver's nonpayment of 
taxes accruing during the receivership constitute a lien on 
the property and are payable by the Receiver. ( R • 4 6 8- 9 ) • Thtl 
assertion and the citations thereto, apply only to penalties 
and interest relating to taxes which accrued during the 
receivership and are inapplicable to penalties and interest oo 
taxes accruing prior to the receivership. This distinction 
has been discussed previously in Point I of this Brief. The 
Commission has cited no authority which imposes a duty on ~e 
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Receiver to pay penalties and interest on taxes which accrued 
prior to the appointment of a receiver. 
A receivership proceeding, like a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding is equitable in nature, and thus the court has con-
siderable discretion in determining the equities of various 
charges and claims. In bankruptcy, no penalties or excessive 
interest for the nonpayment of taxes are allowed as against 
the funds held by the trustee l/ nor is interest allowed after 
the date the petition in bankruptcy is filed. ll In the 
context of a receivership, as in the context of bankruptcy, 
tne assessment of penalties and excess interest against funds 
held by the receiver has no impact on the entity which failed 
to pay the taxes but rather has the effect of penalizing the 
creditors of that entity. Thus, the punitive effect of such 
penalties is lost. Accordingly, the trial court exercised its 
eyuitable discretion and denied penalties and excessive 
interest. This Court should uphold that exercise of dis-
cretion. 
~I 
11 O.S.C.A. §93(j); 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, ~57.22 [2.1] 
at p. 391-2. 
3A Collier on Bankruptcy, ~63.16 [2] at p. 1864-70. 
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The case of Ralph Child Construction Co. v. State 
Tax Commission, 12 Utah 2d 53, 362 P.2d 422 (1961) illustrates 
in another context this policy that penalties should not be 
assessed against persons other than the wrongdoer. Not only 
are pre-receivership penalties inappropriate and inequitable, I 
I 
but post-receivership penalties attributable to pre-filing 
It would be intolerable I 
for a court-appointed officer to scrutinize, challenge and I 
disallow a tax claim at the peril of paying penalties if he ~ rl 
in error or if there should be inadequate funds in the receiver·, 
taxes are particularly inappropriate. 
ship to pay the claim if uncontested. This is dramatized even 
more in this case where the tax claims have no priority over 
other claims and could not be paid until such time as the Tax 
Commission's proportionate interest in the subject funds could ( 
I 
be determined and satisfied. ) 
CONCLUSION I 
The existence of a lien is the only basis upon whi~ · 
the tax claims asserted herein can be given priority over t~ I 
:::i::xo:l::::rh:::d::::s~nt:::r:::: ::a::::sc::::s::gr:~ens ~~ 
quiring the filing of a warrant before such liens arise. No 
warrants were filed with respect to those claims asserted 
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, 
herein by the Tax Commission prior to the appointment of the 
Receiver. Thus, no liens as to those tax claims existed and 
therefore, those tax claims have no priority. 
Therefore, the determination of the District Court 
that these tax claims have no priority was a correct applica-
tion of the relevant statutes and case law, as was its denial 
of the Tax Commission's claim for penalties, and for interest 
accruing subsequent to the institution of the receivership and 
such determination should be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted this ~day of October, 
1979. 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
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